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AN ANARCHIST POLICING? SOME SUGGESTIVE 
EXAMPLES FROM SPECULATIVE FICTION 
 
Jason Royce LINDSEY* 
 
 
Anarchists of the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century assumed that 
crime was a symptom of the capitalist order and expected it to 
wither away in a future anarchist society. Yet, regardless of how 
much scarcity is eliminated and how different the economy becomes, 
wouldn’t there still be crimes of passion? What about anti-social 
behavior related to brain chemistry and personality traits? In the 21
th
 
century, it is difficult to imagine a community of any significant size 
functioning without police to protect individuals from other 
individuals. Does this make anarchism too utopian? Is it possible to 
imagine a practice of policing a community that would satisfy 
anarchist thinking? 
In an exception to many of his contemporaries, Malatesta 
acknowledged the difficulty for anarchism on this point. In an 
exchange of public letters on anarchist thinking and crime he states: 
“To me a policeman is worse than a criminal, at least than a minor 
common criminal; a policeman is more dangerous and harmful to 
society. However, if people do not feel sufficiently protected by the 
public, no doubt they immediately call for the policeman. Therefore, 
the only way of preventing the policeman from existing is to make 
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him useless by replacing him in those functions that constitute a real 
protection for the public.” (Malatesta, 1921). 
Yet, it is difficult to imagine what this replacement of 
traditional police functions would look like. Malatesta himself 
admits that one cannot simply say “the people” would police 
themselves for: “I know that the people is capable of anything: 
ferocious today, generous tomorrow, socialist one day, fascist 
another day, at one time it rises up against the priests and the 
Inquisition, at some other time it watches Giordano Bruno’s stake 
praying and applauding, at one moment it is ready for any sacrifice 
and heroism, at some other moment it is subject to the worst 
influence of fear and greed.” (Ibid.). 
If one cannot rely on a popular or populist form of policing, 
then what is the alternative? Malatesta also suggests that any attempt 
to recreate the police function with specialists threatens to recreate 
the ills found in contemporary society: “Like Venturini, I do not 
want either individual liberty or the crowd’s summary judgement; 
however, I could not accept the solution proposed by Merlino, who 
would like to organize the social defence against criminals as any 
other public service, like health, transportation, etc., because I fear 
the formation of a body of armed people, which would acquire all 
the flaws and present all the dangers of a police corps.” (Ibid). 
Malatesta seeks not the spontaneous vigilante justice of the 
crowd, nor the creation of a specialist police corps, but some other 
alternative. 
I suggest that this alternative would have to be a form of, 
“legitimate policing,” that could satisfy the objections of classical 
anarchists like Malatesta to an otherwise coercive institution and 
practice. Previous attempts to answer this topic by anarchist theorists 
invariably rely on the concept of self-defense. Instead, drawing on 
some insights from utopian (and dystopian) fiction, I argue that we 
can make a distinction between the use of coercive power that 
appeals to philosophical claims for its justification, and coercion that 
is justified by the facts of a past event. Thus, we can imagine some 
form of routine policing in an anarchist society grounded by factual 





necessity rather than policing that masks the violence of a political 
or social system’s ideology. 
Our ability to make headway on such a difficult “detail” of 
anarchism reduces the validity of claims, too often accepted as 
trivially true, that anarchist theory is hopelessly utopian. If we can 
imagine fundamental practices of governance, (like policing), that 
are compatible with anarchist principles, then anarchism is less 
utopian than its detractors claim. In addition, this far-reaching 
theorizing is useful for thinking about our contemporary world. By 
considering the form of coercion and policing acceptable to an 
anarchist society, we gain some insight into the moral limitations of 
growing “security” efforts in our very real society. 
 
I − 
Classical anarchism assumed that, as the old socio-economic 
order withered away, so too would much of the behavior classified 
as “crime”. This assumption is rooted in the view that the legal 
system in most societies is focused on protecting the institution of 
private property and defending the interests of Capital. Kropotkin 
supplies us with some statements that summarize this position from 
classical anarchism. For example: “Two-third of all breaches of law 
being so-called "crimes against property," these cases will disappear, 
or be limited to a quite trifling amount, when property, which is now 
the privilege of the few, shall return to its real source − the 
community.” (Kropotkin, 1887: 366). 
The abolishment of the coercive workplace and the 
disciplinary rules of a capitalist economy would presumably make 
the policing apparatus obsolete. 
Yet, the anarchist commitment to individual freedom also 
raises an immediate concern. If there is anything consistent within 
the many threads of anarchism, it is a focus on individual freedom. 
Even if we imagine a radically different economic system that has 
only voluntary labor, isn’t it likely that non-economic crimes would 
still occur? Within contemporary societies we know that much of the 
most violent, interpersonal crime is driven by individual pathologies. 





How could an anarchist society protect the more vulnerable, 
including children, from abuse and violence? 
If we turn again to Kropotkin for the view from classical 
Anarchism, the answer is found in the radical reformation of society. 
Kropotkin recognizes that changes to the capitalist order would not 
eliminate crime completely. He plainly states in a discussion about 
crime and prisons: “There surely will remain a limited number of 
persons whose anti-social passions − the result of bodily diseases − 
may still be a danger for the community.” (Kropotkin, 1887: 368). 
However, Kropotkin rejects the idea of prison or asylums for such 
individuals. He imagines instead that such individuals would be 
reintegrated into a tightly knit, anarchist community that reeducates 
and rehabilitates them. The comparison he draws on is with the 
approach of smaller communities in Europe that took care of 
individuals considered insane or “mad” within the village, rather 
than exiling them to an asylum or prison1. 
From within the anarchist canon, Kropotkin’s thoughts on 
crime are a good example of how anarchist thinkers viewed the topic 
as part of a grand, wholesale reform of society. Kropotkin’s 
discussion of reintegrating the mentally ill back into a tightly knit 
community has echoes in one of the pieces of speculative fiction 
discusses below. This approach suggests that cultural norms from 
within future, reformed communities would provide the “policing” 
necessary in an anarchist society. 
Alternately, there is a less utopian approach in anarchist theory 
to the problem of policing based on the concept of self-defense. In 
his debate with Venturini cited earlier, Malatesta suggests that an 
idea of self-defense may be the way forward with the question of 
crime: “Therefore I agree that the principle I put forward, i.e. that 
one has a right to resort to material force only against those who 
want to violate someone else’s right by material force, does not 
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cover all the possible cases and cannot be regarded as absolute. 
Perhaps we would come closer to a more comprehensive formula by 
asserting the right to forcible self-defence against physical violence 
as well as against acts equivalent in manner and consequences to 
physical violence.” (Malatesta, op. cit.). 
Nonetheless, Malatesta also quickly recognizes the 
shortcomings of this approach. He states that: “We are entering a 
case by case analysis though, which would require a survey of 
different cases, leading to a thousand different solutions, without 
touching the main point, the greatest difficulty of the question yet, 
i.e. who would judge and who would carry out the judgements?” 
(Ibid.). 
The concept of self-defense invites speculation about when the 
individual has a right to act in self-defense versus when that 
threshold has not been reached. We can imagine other debatable 
scenarios about when an individual should or should not interfere 
with another adult’s actions for the latter’s benefit, such as an 
individual threatening self-harm. 
However, this initial assumption that self-defense can be 
focused upon individual action is contradicted by anarchist 
philosophy itself. Anarchist philosophy often appealed to the ideal of 
self-defense to justify resistance to social wrongs. The anarchist 
assumption is that the free individual must be able to defend himself 
from the unwanted domination of others. To empower the individual 
becomes critical so that he can resist aggressive action coming from 
other elements of society. Thus, anarchists have often styled various 
forms of resistance to capitalist society as the self-defense of the 
community. Beyond just removing the fetters of the state, anarchism 
has often argued that positive efforts are needed to free the 
individual like worker education, forming cooperatives, or radical 
restructuring of work. 
This broad conception of self-defense is a logical step within 
anarchist theory given its prioritization of individual well-being over 
any commitment to protect property. This shift of focus to the 
individual’s health (physical and emotional) is a key difference 





between anarchism and liberalism. For the anarchist theorist, the 
solution to reducing interpersonal conflict in society is not a robust 
regime of property rights. Instead, the anarchist focus on the 
conditions of labor, and whether the individual is thriving in his 
environment, includes a shift to less tangible elements of well-being. 
Classic examples include the anarchist concern with instilling 
respect for the individual laborer in society or whether labor allows 
for individual creativity and self-expression 
Thus, the broad range of action that anarchism has associated 
with self-defense, including organizing workers in various ways, 
fails to focus on the problem of defining acceptable uses of policing 
individual behavior. Instead, the discussion of self-defense justifying 
coercion in Anarchism is a broader argument about the tactics 
justified by class conflict. Classical anarchism’s view of justifiable 
coercion, based on self-defense is an argument about social justice 
and defending an entire class of people. 
Nonetheless, when we do turn more explicitly to questions of 
justifiable individual coercion, we can imagine scenarios that 
include coercion to stop someone from harming himself, which 
would be acceptable even to the staunchest anarchist. Alex 
Butterworth has shown how anarchists reacted to government 
surveillance and persecution in the 19th century by, at times, 
policing their own ranks for informants and collaborators 
(Butterworth, 2011). Beyond highly contextual examples, real and 
hypothetical, that raise questions of justifying self-defense or an 
intervention into another person’s self-destructive behavior, can we 
imagine a broader distinction about coercion that would render its 
social practice and institutionalization legitimate to anarchist 
thinking? What if we are not talking about class conflict and social 




There are suggestive, though fictional, examples for us to 
consider. Despite their imaginative origins, these insights point to a 





common, important distinction: coercion based on facts that are 
retrospective as opposed to possible events. The first of these 
speculative examples is a dystopia from Philip K. Dick’s short story, 
“The Minority Report.” What makes Dick’s imagined society 
oppressive is the slow reveal of an agency devoted to heading off 
“future crime”. In other words, crime that has yet to occur. In the 
film version of Dick’s story, the very idea of “future crime” turns 
upon whether individuals can choose what they will do. In the 
original short story, an individual who oversees the “pre-crime” unit 
is, due to his unique position, able to choose between destinies 
(Dick, 2013: 417-487). 
In our real world, the parallel to this fiction is the attempt to 
establish an all-pervasive and predictive form of security in the 
technology of profiling. In the United States, we see an increasing 
amount of sophisticated profiling in air travel security conducted by 
the TSA. Recent public disclosures show that the TSA uses many 
different databases to compile a profile of each air traveler (Stellin, 
2013). However, the technology of profiling individuals is not 
limited to air travel security. There is growing predictive technology 
that attempts to classify and forecast a broad range of human 
behavior. Are we able to predict the future behavior of an individual 
based upon state of the art data mining and analytics? 
Such dreams of all pervasive security also open the door to 
states expanding their surveillance power. In Philip K. Dick’s, “The 
Minority Report,” the authorities exploit a group of abnormal 
individuals with psychic powers to predict future crimes. In our 
world, states attempt to predict future behavior based on vast 
amounts of information culled from databases. In the United States, 
the program that was most ambitious in this area was known as 
“Total Information Awareness”. Before Congress reduced funding 
for the program, it attempted to combine large amounts of open 
source information, including marketing information, consumer 
credit reports, and phone logs to generate profiles of individuals. 
The goal of the TIA program was to develop profiles that led to the 





interdiction of security risks, primarily terrorism, but other criminal 
activity too, long before it occurred2 
Recent controversies surrounding the National Security 
Agency in the United States reveal that this trend is still alive and 
well. As leaked documents show, the NSA can acquire vast amounts 
of information on every individual in the US who uses a cell phone, 
email, or online social network. The reach of this agency apparently 
includes experiments to track the physical location of individuals 
based on their cell phone activity. In testimony before Congress, the 
head of the NSA stated that he could not rule out the future use of 
this experimental tracking technology, because it was impossible for 
him to predict the future security needs of the United States. 
Subsequent revelations have shown that the NSA has already 
engaged in tracking individuals’ physical locations by using their 
cell phone data (Gellman & Soltani). 
Turning from the dystopian to the utopian, in another fictional 
example, Iain M. Banks’ The Culture novels present us with the 
picture of a very advanced human society that operates on anarchist 
principles3. The Culture is just that, a culture or way of life rather 
than a state. Nonetheless, in Banks’ novels the characters we meet 
are mostly engaged in a form of intelligence work or policing. The 
various characters work for or are contacted by a unit of the culture 
known as “special circumstances”. This paramilitary or intelligence 
                                                 
2  This program is described in detail in Shane Harris (2010). A declassified 
description of the project is available as well in a conference paper by 
Admiral John Poindexter and two other authors. See: John Poindexter, 
Robert Popp, and Brian Sharkey (2003. This paper is remarkable in that it 
at least provides us with the logic behind developing this massive 
surveillance program.  
3  The “Culture” novels by Iain M. Banks include the following titles: 
Consider Phlebas (1987), The Player of Games (1988), Use of Weapons 
(1990), The State of the Art (1991), Excession (1996), Inversions (1998), 
Look to Windward (2001), Matter (2008), Surface Detail (2010), and The 
Hydrogen Sonata (2012). They are available from New York: Orbit, Hachett 
Book group in several different editions. 
 





organization does not have too many rules and it operates outside of 
the Culture’s day-to-day norms. It and the more diplomatic 
“Contact” organization are tasked with inter civilizational 
relationships (in Banks’s science fiction this replaces international 
relations). 
Much like the future crime present in Philip K. Dick’s “The 
Minority Report”, the most controversial question in the Culture is 
over the predictions and longer term strategies pursued by the 
Culture’s hyper intelligent machines, simply known as “minds”. 
These machines can create extremely detailed simulation programs 
tailored for the problems faced by the Culture. Their forecasts and 
predictions for what the Culture should and should not do through 
“Contact,” and “Special Circumstances” are debated by the society 
for several reasons. 
The most relevant of these fictional controversies for our 
present discussion is that the Culture’s hyper intelligent “minds” can 
scan the brains of humans and construct starkly accurate models for 
their predictive programs. Thus, in the imagined world of the 
“Culture” surveillance is practically perfect. The machine “minds” 
can make a copy of a human’s mind and thus, the human’s thought 
processes. The result is that one of their simulation programs is, in 
effect, a controlled version of reality since it features the same 
human brains responding to a situational problem. However, the 
invasion of privacy required to replicate a human being’s mind 
creates an ethical dilemma within the Culture. Banks presents this as 
a difficult choice for the “minds” of the Culture when they seek to 
keep the civilization secure from threats. This choice becomes one 
of the primary tensions in the novels. 
The second controversy that is described by Banks is very 
reminiscent of Philip K. Dick’s world in, “The Minority Report”. 
Banks imagines that with even perfect information attempts to model 
the future can still fail to anticipate what will happen. As Banks 
describes “The Chaos problem meant that in certain situations you 
could run as many simulations as you liked, and each would produce 
a meaningful result, but taken as a whole there would be no 





discernible pattern to them, and so no lesson to be drawn or obvious 
course laid out to pursue; it would all depend so exquisitely on how 
you had chosen to tweak the initial conditions at the start of each 
run…” (Banks, 2012: 299-300). 
For the machine “minds” of the Culture these variabilities are 
an interesting phenomenon, but they are also frustrating in that they 
eliminate certainty from the difficult decisions they must often make 
about the security of the Culture. Because of this uncertainty, there is 
an even greater moral tension when the “minds” turn to predictive 
simulations which violate the Culture’s norms about privacy. 
From this fictional universe, Banks presents us with an 
interesting intuition. In an anarchist society, the use of coercion 
based on prediction and profiling seems out of the question. To 
generate realistic, and hence useful, profiles (or “simulations” in the 
universe of the Culture) a massive amount of information must be 
gathered. The amount of surveillance this necessitates places such 
“simming” largely out of bounds for the minds of the Culture. 
Furthermore, even in cases where the minds are worried about the 
security of the Culture itself, they face another philosophical 
objection. Even if the emergency seems to justify breaching privacy 
for a realistic simulation, can the accuracy of the simulation ever be 
guaranteed enough to justify the costs to privacy of gathering the 
required information? Is invading privacy to the extent needed for 
absolute security ever justifiable? 
Thus, in both Dick’s dystopia of “the Minority Report” and in 
Banks’ utopia of “the Culture” we find objections to the use of 
predictive policing that relies on the profiling of individuals. The 
future orientation of such coercion challenges the ideal of individual 
choice and free will. On the other hand, do these fictional examples 
suggest forms of policing that are more acceptable to an anarchic or 
at least highly libertarian society? 
There are also arrangements in, “the Culture”, for dealing with 
individuals who commit crimes of passion. Typically, they are 
placed under the surveillance of one of the Culture's hyper 
intelligent machines. This supervision lasts until their behavior 





demonstrates that they are no longer a threat to others. Similarly, in 
Ursula K. Le Guin’s The Dispossessed we learn that the anarchist 
society envisioned therein also has arrangements for remaining 
forms of crime.4 However, in the society Le Guin imagines there is 
much more social pressure than in “the Culture.” In The 
Dispossessed, we learn that an individual is regarded as at least 
eccentric if not distastefully selfish because he tends to hoard 
various items for his individual use. Individuals are socialized to live 
near others in shared living space. Thus, Le Guin’s imaginary 
anarchist society substitutes traditional policing with strong cultural 
norms and customs. This is reminiscent of Kropotkin’s 19
th
 century 
description of small, tightly integrated villages supervising 
individuals who have violated the community’s norms. 
How would an anarchist society cope with an individual who is 
pathologically violent, or one who abuses family members? In the 
imagined utopias of Le Guin and Banks, the difficulties remain in 
instances where custom is not enough. When custom and social 
norms fail, and when individuals begin to interfere with the freedom 
of others, these imaginary societies have a mechanism of 
supervision, but it is based on the past behavior of the individual, 
not suppositions about his future behavior. There is no winning 
argument in the worlds of, “the Culture”, or The Dispossessed for 
gathering large amounts of information on each individual and then 
attempting to predict what they will do next. In the world imagined 
by Philip K. Dick, the attempt at policing the future is ultimately a 




Drawing together these observations from classical anarchism 
and speculative fiction; what can we conclude about the possibility 
of a legitimate form of anarchist policing? Furthermore, what do 
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such broad speculations tell us about policing in our very real 
world? 
First, any attempt at policing that attempts to be predictive, 
will clash with anarchist principles. The imagined examples we have 
of such law enforcement inevitably require massive surveillance. We 
have tangible examples in our world of highly intrusive surveillance 
that uses the latest technology and individual consumer information 
to predict what individuals will do. In the work of both Dick and 
Banks, there is philosophical speculation about the accurateness and 
utility of such efforts given the freewill of human beings. 
Furthermore, their portrayals of the level of surveillance necessary 
for omniscient profiling relays a clear dystopian warning. 
Another difficulty illustrated by Philip K. Dick’s story is that 
predictive policing and profiling imposes an impossible form of 
responsibility on the individual. The individual is being forced to 
assume responsibility for actions that he has not taken. Arguably, an 
authority can assert that there is a high probability that the individual 
is likely to commit a crime, but there is a spectrum of possibility 
here. By profiling individuals, the police are not intervening in an 
unfolding plot. Instead, there is a claim that based on past 
surveillance results; the individual is likely to commit a crime. This 
denies the possibility of individual moral choice. It is an assumption 
against human free will. 
In contrast, a form of policing that is plausibly compatible with 
anarchist views of the individual must be based on retrospective 
facts. After the individual has committed a crime, fair procedures 
could establish the sequence of events. The individual would be 
judged based not on his profile or predictions about his action, but 
based on behavior from a specific set of events. This past behavior 
could then be cited for punishing the individual, placing them under 
supervision, or surveillance, etc. Moreover, the burden on the 
individual from predictive policing seems morally questionable. 
How can I be held responsible for actions that I have not even 
committed, but might commit if I conform to the past behavior of 
others? 





Common Law has as a basic principle the dictum that 
ignorance of the law is no defense for breaking it. Nonetheless, we 
have a strong moral intuition that holding individuals responsible for 
obscure or archaic laws and regulations is not just. William Ophuls 
has complained about this situation in the contemporary United 
States arguing that: “The volume and complexity of statutes and the 
rapidity with which they are amended makes a mockery of the legal 
fiction that ‘ignorance of the law is no excuse.’ Even full-time 
specialists find the labyrinth daunting, and the bureaucrats who 
inflict the laws on the public repeatedly err in their interpretation of 
them.” (Ophuls, 2011: 14). 
This problem in the US illustrates our philosophical intuitions 
in this area. For most of us the idea of proportionate justice requires 
that an individual knowingly breaks the law. Otherwise, the idea of 
punishment as deterrence becomes incomprehensible. If our 
philosophical intuitions suggest that individuals breaking obscure 
laws in ignorance should not be judged harshly, then what can we 
say about an individual being judged for possible, future behavior 
based on the observation of others? Is it philosophically plausible to 
assert that the idea of punishment in this case resembles our usual 
assumptions about individual guilt? 
In our world, the idea of predictive policing is geared toward 
preventing political extremism. In other words, attempting to police 
people over the metaphysical ideas we have of the best political 
order or society. Most security service attempts at profiling terrorists 
are aimed at predicting who will become radicalized. These attempts 
essentially police the philosophical commitments of individuals. The 
justification for this policing is the danger posed by extremists. 
However, the threat to society by this form of policing is great too, 
given the amount of information an agency requires to build reliable 
profiles and the moral compromises it is willing to make to do so.   
Of course, the logic of such forms of policing is obvious. If a 
sect of radicals has in the past engaged in terrorism, then logically 
one could try to head off further attacks by identifying similar 
radicals (or even potential radicals). However, a very old 





observation in political philosophy is that a gulf exists between 
speech, actions, and an individual’s intent. Policing that tries to 
intervene at the level of individual philosophical and political 
convictions will inevitably become intrusive. Many individuals hold 
unusual or extreme opinions about government and society. A 
serious attempt to create a reliable system of identifying an even 
smaller subset of individuals who may commit a crime because of 
those beliefs is likely to require massive surveillance of everyone. 
The vast apparatus of surveillance necessary for profiling 
individuals suggests something more than an extension of our 
current crime interdiction capabilities. The push to so called, 
“broken windows” policing relies on a data driven form of 
interdiction5. In this case the data is based on crimes reported by 
neighborhood to predict where police should focus their efforts. 
However, the shift toward profiling is different. Suspect profiling 
looks at the past behavioral patterns of convicted criminals or, 
within the security services, “known extremists” to predict the 
behavior of different, unique individuals. Data driven interdiction 
that examines crime rates in different neighborhoods is based on 
events rather than behaviors. 
Thus, there is an important sleight of hand behind the 
proposition that profiling individuals is the same thing. One is 
making a different philosophical argument when one claims that my 
future behavior can be predicted based on the past behavior of other 
individuals who are like, but not, me. This assumption denies a 
whole host of variables that cannot be obtained from any data 
source. Specifically, forms of policing based on profiling and 
predictive trends cannot rest on the same moral foundation as that of 
traditional policing, which cites past events. This critical difference 
suggests that the growing use of profiling for security and policing 
requires a stronger philosophical justification. 
                                                 
5  For the essay that gave this form of policing its name see: James Q. 
Wilson, and George L. Kelling (1982: 29-38). For a critique of this theory 
of policing see: Bernard E. Harcourt (2001). 






There is another complication with policing in an anarchist 
society. Arguably, the one argument that unites the very disparate 
camps of anarchism together is their rejection of sovereignty. For all 
anarchists, the claim that states possess something we can call 
sovereign power is either an immoral argument or an illogical one. 
The objection is that the state cannot realistically be the ultimate 
authority in all areas on every subject. There is also a fear of the vast 
coercive power the idea of sovereignty transfers to the state. 
The analogue for this concern with policing is the obvious 
question of how much authority and coercion would be acceptable 
under what conditions. Recent controversies in the United States 
over the use of force by police shows the practical concern here. 
There have been numerous, well publicized incidents where routine 
traffic stops or other small infractions have escalated into deadly 
encounters. The life and death power of the police in such situations 
is like the unlimited, sovereign power states claim to possess. In a 
sense, the police are the embodiment of the state when they claim to 
exercise ultimate authority in the state's name. 
Just as anarchism rejects the principle of state sovereignty, it is 
difficult to imagine how an anarchist society could condone today’s 
guidelines for deadly force in policing. If anarchist theory rejects the 
plausibility of the state possessing an all-encompassing authority, 
then it is extremely difficult to imagine how it could allow for 
individual state agents to have the power of life and death. On the 
other hand, one can imagine anarchist thinkers supporting actions by 
a law enforcement officer that protects an individual from harm. 
Indeed, if anarchism seeks to liberate individuals from coercive 
interference, then the efforts of policing to protect the vulnerable 
from abuse or crimes of passion seems compatible with anarchist 
ideals. 
This line of reasoning suggests that the compatibility of 
policing with anarchist philosophy depends upon two broader issues. 
The first is the object or goal of this policing. Are police activities 
oriented to protecting individuals from the abusive behavior of other 





individuals? The second closely related issue is one of 
proportionality. Does the amount of coercion used in policing 
correspond to the level of threat it seeks to prevent? 
In an anarchist society, we can imagine that the grounds for 
police action would be greatly circumscribed compared to today’s 
real world “probable cause”. With fewer behaviors classified as 
crime, given the abandonment of policing for the sake of a capitalist 
order, the scope of police authority would be greatly diminished. 
Under what occasions could anarchist policing ever accept the 
idea of deadly force? Here perhaps is where the old insight of self-
defense fits into an anarchist theory of policing. The current 
controversies in the US involving the use of deadly force would be 
unacceptable because of the escalation to deadly coercion over 
routine policing of traffic and other laws. The only way we could 
imagine the use of deadly force being allowed would be conditions 
of self-defense, or the defense of a bystander in an extreme situation.   
Do any of these observations show that an anarchist society is 
incapable of providing something as basic to governance as 
policing? The examples from speculative fiction and the 
contributions cited above from anarchist theorists point to two 
objections with policing. 
First, a form of predictive policing or profiling in the interests 
of security is incompatible with anarchist thinking. The research 
literature supporting this form of policing claims to be based on past 
actions and facts. However, the vast amounts of information that 
security services are acquiring in their attempts at profiling people 
suggests something deeper. Attempts at policing and security 
through predictive profiling is an application of coercion against 
either individuals based on the past actions of others, or the broader 
philosophical, religious, and political beliefs they hold. In either 
case, this is a weak justification for coercion against human beings. 
It discounts the individual characteristic that anarchists are most 
concerned with protecting: individual free will. 
Second, an anarchist society would only accept police actions 
that are proportional to the risks posed by a crime. Turning back to 





speculative fiction, Le Guin’s imagined anarchist society in The 
Dispossessed seems very demanding culturally on the individuals 
within it6. This requirement arises in part from the living conditions 
of the population. It also points to the cultural self-regulation in the 
society she imagines. One suspects then, that legitimate coercion 
against individuals in an anarchist society would be reserved for 
those cases or actions that lead to a substantial harm. Policing of 
individuals and suspicion requiring surveillance is conceivable, but 
only on the grounds of their past behavior. Behavior that justifies 
such intervention in an anarchist society would be “crime” because it 
broke the strong culture and customs of such a community, causing 
harm to another individual. 
Both of these conclusions are highly suggestive for our very 
real society. Policing with profiling rests upon judging the individual 
by the actions of others or prosecuting them (including intrusive 
surveillance) based upon their metaphysical beliefs. Current 
descriptions of such efforts obscure this critical distinction. 
Nonetheless, the new technology of profiling future behavior based 
on the analysis of vast surveillance is a far cry from our traditional 
notions of justice and policing. If states are to continue to pursue 
such policing efforts, then a fuller philosophical justification for 
them is required. 
As for the utopian nature of anarchism, fictional descriptions 
of anarchist societies describe a culture in which individuals must 
show a great deal of tolerance toward others. Le Guin describes a 
society in which cultural norms are quite rigorous. Banks describes a 
society in “the Culture” that possesses a high degree of free speech 
and acceptance for the behavior of others. Kropotkin long ago 
speculated that anarchist society would have to regulate any 
remaining criminal behavior within tightly knit communities. The 
goal of such interventions would be to reintegrate the individual in 
                                                 
6  For the best discussion of Le Guin’s writing and anarchism see: Laurence 
Davis and Peter Stillman (2005). 





society. Are these outlandish, utopian ideas such a bad suggestion 
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Anarchists of the 19th and early 20th centuries assumed that crime was a 
symptom of the capitalist order and expected it to wither away along with 
other social pathologies. Yet, regardless of how much scarcity is eliminated 
and how different the economy becomes, wouldn’t there still be anti-social 
behavior and crime? Drawing upon insights from utopian (and dystopian) 
fiction, I make a distinction between the use of coercive power that appeals 
to philosophical claims for its justification, and coercion that is justified by 
the facts of a past event. Thus, I argue that we can imagine some form of 
routine policing in an anarchist society grounded by factual necessity rather 
than policing that masks the violence of a political or social system’s 
ideology. By considering the form of coercion and policing acceptable to an 
anarchist society, we gain some insight into the moral limitations of 
growing “security” efforts in our very real society. 
 





Un contrôle anarchiste : quelques exemples suggestifs tirés de la 
fiction spéculative 
Les anarchistes du XIXe et du début du XXe siècle ont supposé que le crime 
était un symptôme de l’ordre capitaliste et s’attendait à ce qu'il se dissipe 
avec d’autres pathologies sociales. Pourtant, indépendamment de la 
quantité de pénurie éliminée et de la différence entre l’économie, il n’y 
aurait pas encore de comportement antisocial et de crime? S’appuyant sur 





les connaissances de la fiction utopique (et dystopique), je fais une 
distinction entre l’utilisation du pouvoir coercitif qui fait appel aux 
revendications philosophiques pour sa justification et la coercition qui est 
justifiée par les faits d’un événement passé. Ainsi, je prétends que nous 
pouvons imaginer une forme de police de routine dans une société 
anarchiste fondée sur une nécessité factuelle plutôt que sur une police qui 
masque la violence de l’idéologie d'un système politique ou social. En 
considérant la forme de coercition et de maintien de l’ordre acceptable pour 
une société anarchiste, nous avons une idée des limites morales des efforts 
croissants de «sécurité» dans notre société très réelle. 
 
Mots-clefs: Malatesta, Kropotkin, anarchisme, police, fiction utopique. 
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